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URING the later 19603, two American military crises, involving the U.S.S. Liberty and the U.S.S. Pueblo, were exacerbated by unacceptably long delays in the delivery of critical messages. Members of Congress investigating the quality of U. S. military communications [ 11 -[4] identified several causes for the communications delays, including two problems in military message processing: lengthy processing times and opportunities for human error.
A likely means of reducing communications delays lies in computer technology. Given the decreasing cost and increasing power of computer hardware, the application of computers to message processing has become especially attractive in recent years. As a result, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is gradually replacing many manual procedures for handling messages with computer-based message processing systems. To the DoD, automation represents a means of reducing message processing times and eliminating costly errors; in addition, computer-based message systems are expected to provide military personnel with greater flexibility in tasks such as message composition, message storage and retrieval, and message distribution.
During the last decade, the DoD has gained operational experience with two classes of computer-based message systems: those that automate message handling tasks in message centers (where military messages are delivered for transmission and picked up after receipt) and those that provide direct automated support to the drafters and recipients of messages. Additionally, the DoD has sponsored several research projects in message technology, including the Military Message Experiment (MME) [5] -[22] , a study of the military utility of advanced computer-based message handling systems.
This paper describes the current status and future directions of automated message handling in the DoD. Section I identifies two classes of messages used by military personnel. Section 11 focuses on those requirements that distinguish military message systems from other message handling systems. Section 111 describes four message systems that have been used operationally within the DoD: the Local Digital Message exchange (LDMX) [23] [ 191 . Section IV discusses the background and lessons learned in the MME. Section V describes the family approach to message system development. Finally, Section VI identifies several trends and research issues in military message systems.
I. CLASSES OF MILITARY MESSAGES
Military messages can be divided into two classes: formal and informal. The DoD has had the most experience with formal messages, i.e., messages exchanged by military organizations rather than individuals. Typically, the commander of one military organization sends a message to the commander@) of one or more other military organizations. Informal messages are messages exchanged by individuals with the support of computer systems. Only in recent years with the advent of computer-based systems have a significant number of military personnel exchanged informal messages.
Formal Messages
The formal message is a primary component of the DoD's command and control system. Most military operations and policies are initiated, discussed, and recorded via formal messages transmitted over military communications networks. Formal messages are always on the record; for this reason, they are sometimes called record traffic. They are stored for lengthy periods after their initial transmission.
Because of the importance attached to formal messages, the DoD has several military standards that govern their format and use (e.g., [29] -[31] Military personnel found these simple message handling systems useful for a variety of tasks: announcing meetings, asking questions of individuals difficult to reach over the telephone, and distributing and commenting on drafts of formal messages. They also discovered that communicating informally with messages is not simply a replacement for letters, telegrams, and telephone conversations; it is a new means of communication [34] , [35] . The average delivery time for informal messages is much less than that for letters and telegrams. Unlike the participants in a telephone conversation, the sender and receiver of informal messages need not be available at the same time. In contrast to telephone communications, informal messages provide a written record that is easy to store, retrieve, duplicate, and forward to others.
Informal messages usually have fewer fields than formal messages. Fields required in all informal messages include TO, FROM, and TEXT. Often, a SUBJECT field and a CC (carbon copy) field are also included.
REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY MESSAGE SYSTEMS
Formal Messages
The requirements for computer systems that handle formal messages fall into three categories: functional capabilities, performance requirements, and security and privacy requirements.
I ) Functional Capabilities: The functional capabilities that are required to process formal military messages may be divided into three categories: the handling of incoming messages, the handling of outgoing messages, and message storage and retrieval.
a) Incoming messages 0 Distribution determination. Because military organizations often consist of hundreds of individuals, determining which individuals should receive a particular message is a complex and difficult activity called distribution determination or simply distribution. Distribution of a formal message to the proper individual may take place in a single step. More Often, however, the message is directed to a group, and additional steps are required before the message reaches the appropriate individual within the group. Traditionally, the initial distribution list for an incoming message was generated by message center personnel. Increasingly, however, computer systems are being used to support this function. In a few cases, distribution has been almost completely automated. Computer-based message systems apply a simple algorithm to the message content to determine which individuals should receive the message. Those messages which cannot be distributed automatically are identified and distributed manually. In other cases, an automated message system determines which groups within a large organization will receive a particular message. The specific recipients of the message within the group are then determined manually, sometimes with the aid of a computer system. 0 Action and information assignment. A message transmitted from one military organization to another is sent for either action or information. A message sent ."for information" informs the organization of some decision or action. An organization receiving a "for action"-message must respond, either with a formal message in reply or with the action required by the message.
0 Generation of action logs. After a message has been transmitted to an organization for action, it is usually distributed to a single individual for action and to others for information. An individual receiving a message for action may in turn assign action to another individual. Many military organizations maintain a list of incoming action messages and the individuals to whom action has been assigned; this list is called the action log.
0 Generation of readboards. Often, messages of interest to a specific group within an organization are collected together and inserted in binders called readboards. These binders are then circulated to all members of the group. b ) Outgoing messages 0 Drafting. Any individual within a military organization may draft a formal message. The procedure used to generate a draft varies. Most often, the originator writes the message in longhand and then gives a copy to a secretary for typing onto a special message form. A few systems (see the NMIC-SS and SIGMA descriptions below) permit the originator or a secretary to prepare a message interactively on a computer-based message system. Often, the drafter of a message needs to look at other messages and other pertinent documents. For example, a user replying to a message usually obtains a copy of the original message. 0 Coordination. Once it has been drafted, a message must go through a process known as coordination. The purpose of coordination is to allow interested individuals within the organization to review the message prior to its transmission. Each coordinator may write comments on his copy. Once a coordinator's annotated copy is returned to the originator, the coordinator is said to have chopped on the message. Upon receiving the coordinators' comments, the originator may re-vise the message and then reinitiate the coordination process. When the drafter is satisfied with the message draft, he submits it for release. 0 Release. Only a few high-level individuals within an organization have the authority to release a message. A,releaser authorizes the transmission of a formal message by signing it. If the necessary restrictions can be strictly enforced, it is likely that many military organizations will automate the release function.
0 Generation of comeback copies. After a message is released, a comeback copy of the message is generated for the message drafter. Comeback copies may also be generated for other individuals within the originating organization. The latter is called the message's local or internal distribution.
0 Readdressal. Occasionally, a military organization receives a formal message that it wishes to forward to another organization. Such forwarding is called readdressal. c) Message storage and retrieval 0 Long-term storage. Each formal message must be retained for a reasonably long period after its initial transmission. A typical storage period is six months, although some commands require messages to be retained forever. The retrieval time for recent messages is required to be reasonably short. Traditionally, messages have been retrieved by DTG and the name of the originator. Increasingly, however, military personnel are requiring greater convenience in this area; they want to be able to retrieve messages based on other fields, such as SUBJECT or KEYWORDS. User files. Military personnel must be able to retain and organize copies of formal messages in their own personal files. Currently, most users rely on paper files. As military message handling becomes more automated, users are likely to replace many of these paper files with computer files.
2) Performance Requirements: Because some messages are so critical, military message systems must be survivable. That is, they must be resistant to military attacks so that formal messages can still be processed during crises. These systems must also have high availability. Additional performance requirements include timely delivery of formal messages to their individual recipients and timely retrieva2 of previously transmitted messages.
Within the DoD, the precedence level assigned to a formal message before transmission specifies the maximum delivery time for the message. The highest precedence level is called FLASH OVERRIDE; a message at this level must be delivered to its recipients within a few minutes after the start of its transmission. All military organizations use special handling procedures for high-precedence messages to ensure that their delivery times are met. Messages with lower precedence levels have longer acceptable delivery times.
3) Security and Privacy Requirements: Every formal military message is assigned an overall security classification, such as UNCLASSIFIED or SECRET. Furthermore, a message may contain fields or subfields at different security levels. For example, the SUBJECT of a message may be classified at a lower level than the message as a whole, or two paragraphs of the TEXT field of a message may have different classifications.
Consequently, computer systems that process formal military messages need to handle information at multipk security levels.
In Some applications, computer system users process information at a single security level for long periods of time. However, message system users need to be able to deal with more than one security level during a single 'computer session. For example, a message system user may wish to display an incoming SECRET message using the system at the SECRET level and create an UNCLASSIFIED reply using the system at the &CLASSIFIED level. He also may wish to extract textual information and place it in a message with a classification different from the source.
The major security requirements for message system softwave are to ensure 1) that users cannot gain access to information for which they are not cleared and 2) that the security classification of information in the system cannot be modified improperly. Unfortunately, most software cannot be trusted to allow multilevel operation and at the same time enforce these security requirements. As a result, many computer-based systems in DoD operate in system-high mode:' every user is cleared to the level of the most highly classified information on the system. A major consequence of system-high operation is that all data leaving the computer system must be considered classified at the system-high level until a reviewer manually assigns the proper classification.
It would be highly desirable to have multilevel secure message systems, since such systems would not require all users to be cleared to the level of the highest information processed. Moreover, information leaving a multilevel secure message system could be assigned its actual security level rather than the level of the most highly classified information in the system. Unlike message systems that operate in system-high mode, a multilevel secure message system could preserve the different classifications of information that it processes.
Future attempts to produce multilevel secure message systems will depend upon current efforts to build secure operating systems (e.g., Kernelized Secure Operating System (KSOS) [36] , Secure Communications Processor (SCOMP) [37] , and Provably Secure Operating System (PSOS) [38] ). (KSOS and SCOMP are based on the construction of security kernels.) These operating systems will be mathematically verified to conform to a mathematical model [39] of the DoD security policy, which includes more formal versions of the requirements cited above: 1) that the subject cannot read information unless his security level is greater than or equal to the security level of the information (the simple-security rule) and 2) that a subject cannot lower the security level of information (the *-property). Violation of the *-property would allow access to information by subjects with lower security levels. Advocates of the kernel technology claim that it will be possible to construct multilevel secure message systems based on these operating systems [40] .
Message systems may also be required to enforce privacy controls, i.e., controls that restrict message access to those persons who have some need to see a message. (we are not referring to the controls legislated in the Privacy Act of 1974.) Even with a SECRET clearance, a user is not allowed to read all information at SECRET or below: he is only permitted to view information for which he has a need-to-know. Additionally, a coordinator often wishes to prevent circulation of his comments concerning a message. While enforcement of privacy is desirable in systems that handle formal messages, its importance to the DoD has been secondary to enforcement of security controls. This is largely due to the fact that preventing the unauthorized disclosure of classified information is easier than preventing violations of privacy.
Informal Messages
The requirements for computer systems that process informal message are mostly a subset of those associated with systems that process formal messages. While many of the functions that apply to formal messages (message composition, display, storage, and retrieval) are useful in handling informal messages, others (distribution determination, action assignment, 'release, and coordination) are less relevant. Moreover, the performance requirements for informal messages are typically less stringent. A lower message system availability may be tolerated. Additionally, delays in the delivery of informal' messages do not usually have the serious consequences of delays of high precedence formal messages.
Privacy is a requirement of major concern for informal messages. Individuals who exchange informal messages need assurance that they can keep their cominunications to themselves. It is likely that such assurance will be available if message systems are constructed with secure operating systems that enforce discretionary access controls as a part of their overall security policy (e&, KSOS [36] 
FOUR EXAMPLES OF COMPUTER-BASED MILITARY MESSAGE SYSTEMS
This section describes four automated message systems: the LDMX, the NMIC-SS, HERMES, and SIGMA, showing how each has been used operationally within the DoD. See Table I for a comparison of prominent features of these systems.
,
Background
Between 1960 and the present, much of the processing of military messages has been automated. Automation has taken place in three stages.
The first stage occurred in the 1960's when formal messages, which previously had been transferred manually between military organizations, were sent over communications networks such as the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN)
The second stage began in the early 1970's when the LDMX and similar systems, called telecommunications center message systems, were introduced to military message centers. These systems. automate many message processing tasks, such as error checking and statistics gathering, that were previously performed by message center personnel. LDMX supports the handling of both incoming and outgoing formal messages but does not process informal messages. While systems like the LDMX were cost-effective for large message centers, they were too expensive to install in message centers with small traffic loads. Currently, a small computer-based system, called the Remote Information exchange Terminal (RIXT)
[32], is being built by the Navy to automate message processing tasks in many of its smaller message centers.
[291, P O I . The LDMX permits users to retrieve a message by identifying its DTG and originator. While the LDMX attempts to ke,ep each message it processes online for a period of fifteen -0 t-hirty days, occasionally messages must be archived before cations, supports only informal communications.
SIGMA,-an .&';hey are fifteen days old to make room for new incoming .~ experimental message system developed for the MME, has a number of special functions useful in handling formal military messages. While these four systems share many common features,especially the NMIC-SS, HERMES, and SIGMA, below we focus on the characteristics that distinguish them,
Local Digital Message Exchange (LDMX) [23]
Since 1971, the Navy has installed an LDMX at several of its largest message centers. Each LDMX is connected to AUTODIN, a world-wide message switching network that transmits formal military messages for the DoD and for other U.S. and Allied governmental agencies.
The LDMX processes messages it receives from AUTODIN first-in first-out by precedence. It handles all messages whose addresses are on its guard list, a list of military organizations for which the LDMX has responsibility. The LDMX checks for duplicate messages and for messages with formatting errors. Messages in which no errors are detected are scanned for certain codewords. The LDMX uses these to prepare a distribution list for the message. For some organizations, the LDMX distributes messages directly to' individuals. For others, it distributes each message to a group within the organization. Finally, each message is printed by the LDMX on a reproduc-' ible mat. Message center personnel manually reproduce each message and insert the message copies in the appropriate pigeon-holes for "over-the-counter" service. Periodically, couriers pick up the message copies and deliver them to their destinations. Special procedures are used to ensure that high precedence messages are handled expeditiously.
The LDMX fags to generate a distribution list for 10-20 percent [41] of the messages it receives from AUTODIN. When this happens or when the LDMX detects an error in a message, it alerts a service clerk working at a visual display terminal. The clerk uses the visual display terminal to correct the problem, after which the message is requeued for additional processing by the LDMX. Those messages that cannot be corrected are printed as received.
A message to be transmitted to AUTODIN via the LDMX is prepared offline. It is usually read into the LDMX via an optical character reader (OCR), although messages recorded on cards and paper tape are also acceptable. The LDMX scans each message for errors and forwards those in which errors are found to a service clerk for correction. Once a message is identified as error-free, the LDMX generates the format and messages. Archived messages are recorded on magnetic tape or microfilm, where they are maintained for at least six months.
National Military Intelligence Center Support System (NMIC-SS) /24J
The NMIC-SS was developed for intelligence analysts at the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) in the Pentagon. The major responsibility of these analysts is to collect, correlate, and disseminate intelligence data to decision makers at all levels of the DoD. The NMIC receives a large volume of traffic (see Table I ) that must be delivered with acceptably short delays to the appropriate anhysts.
The NMIC-SS receives formal messages over its electrical connection to AUTODIN. It also supports the transmission and receipt of informal messages called Indications Communications or INDICOM messages. AU NMIC-SS users are a part of the INDICOM network. Each member of the network can use the NMIC-SS to transmit and receive INDICOM messages. .
The NMIC-SS uses profiles to automate the distribution of incoming formal messages. In addition, profiles allow analysts to assign subject indexes to each incoming message so-as to permit later retrieval of the message from the NMIC-SS master file. Each NMIC analyst can have several profiles. For example, the analyst responsible for South American data might create a profile for each country in South America. To create a profile, the analyst identifies words and phrases, called search rems, that are likely to appear in messages of interest to him. In addition, the analyst lists all individuals, called disseminees, who are to receive messages that match his profile.'Disseminees fall into two categories, depending on whether or not they are users of the NMIC-SS.
The master file contains all formal messages received by the NMIC-SS from AUTODIN. Messages remain in this file for approximately 13 days [42] and are then purged from the system. NMIC-SS users can retrieve a single message from the file by indicating its DTG alone or its DTG and originator. To retrieve several messages, the user can use logical combinations of DTG range, originator, disseminees, and subject index(es).
The NMIC-SS provides a limited capability for message composition but does not currently support the direct transmission of an outgoing message to AUTODIN. It can, however, print a message in OCR font so that the message may be signed and then carried to the message center to be read into AUTODIN via an OCR However, formal messages generated in this manner are not added to the NMIC-SS master file.
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H E M E S (2 7/ -/28/
HERMES is available on several PDP-10 computers connected to the ARPA network. Several hundred individuals employed by the Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) are major users of HERMES [45] . DARCOM's responsibility is to develop, purchase, supply, and maintain the Army's equipment.
HERMES users at DARCOM are located at approximately 25 different sites throughout the U.S. They use HERMES to communicate with each other and, to a lesser extent, with members of other Army agencies, the Navy, and the Air Force [45] . Much of DARCOM's work requires a complex series of actions by several people. HERMES provides an effective means of coordinating these actions. For.example, HERMES is used to circulate the draft of a proposed policy statement; recipients of the draft use HERMES to record and distribute their comments. In addition, HERMES messages are used to schedule meetings, to transmit agenda, and to distribute meeting summaries. DARCOM users are drawn from a broad range of job categories, from clerks and secretaries to high-level managers [4$]. Some of the latter use HERMES directly, while others depend upon clerical personnel to handle their HERMES mail.
Commonly used HERMES capabilities include helping the drafter to compose his message, transmitting the message to a communications network, making it directly available to the recipient for viewing or printing, and allowing the user to store and later retrieve it. Only a small number of people use more sophisticated HERMES functions, such as those associated with templates, filters, and switches. Templates permit users to vary the output format of their messages or to specify the order in which they will be prompted for fields when composing a message draft. Filters are logical combinations of various search criteria, used to retrieve one or more messages from a message file. Switches permit a HERMES user to tailor the user interface to his own style. For further details, see ~7 1 , p i .
SIGMA ( 5 / , (13/-/16/, (19/
SIGMA, developed as part of the MME, was used operationally by approximately 100 officers and staff personnel in the Operations Directorate (called 53) and the command tenter of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). These users had access to 24 interactive visual display terminals and seven printers. SIGMA's development was evolutionary: prior to and during the operational phase of the experiment, users participated regularly in decisions to add new functions to SIGMA and to modify existing ones.
Since SIGMA was connected electronically to the LDMX, CINCPAC personnel used SIGMA both to receive and send formal messages over AUTODIN. In addition, SIGMA supports informal messages as well a third message class, formal memoranda, which are on-the-record messages exchanged by individual SIGMA users. Messages of different classes vary slightly in the message fields that they contain and in the functions that users may apply to them.
Like other interactive message systems, SIGMA supports the delivery and display of incoming messages, the composition and transmission of outgoing messages, and message storage and retrieval. In addition, SIGMA has a number of special features that make it highly useful for many military applications. One of these is computer-aided message distribution. SIGMA's major user community, the CINCPAC Operations Directorate, did not desire complete automation of the distribution function. Instead, all messages selected by the LDMX for the Directorate were presented by SIGMA to a special user, who, after review of a given message, determined its distribution within 53. Other key SIGMA features are online action logs and readboards, computer-based message coordination, automation of the release function and of readdressal, message archival, and message retrieval from archival storage. For further details, see [ 151 .
The SIGMA message service represents a significant advance in the development of multilevel secure message systems. Although the service is implemented on the nonsecure TENEX operating system, the user interface is designed as though it were running on a security kernel; the result is that SIGMA's interface would remain unchanged if SIGMA were reconstructed to operate with a kernel [5] . Currently, there are no other computer-based message systems in use within DoD that have a multilevel secure user interface, i.e., an interface that reflects the restrictions imposed by a formal security policy. A key feature of SIGMA's secure user interface is a multilevel user terminal [16] with special function keys for security-relevant operations. The screen of the multilevel terminal is divided into several windows, each of which is a logically independent terminal. The windows scroll independently and may have different security levels. Each terminal contains two sets of security lights. One set indicates the security classification of the window in which the cursor is located. The second set of lights indicates the security level of the most highly classified information on the screen.
To define and support their secure interface, SIGMA designers developed a special software architecture [5] . A SIGMA user interacts with up to five different processes: a trusted process, an unclassified control process, and one process for each of the three levels of classified information that SIGMA supports. Each process other than the trusted process is constrained to write data only at its own level and to read data at its level or below. The trusted process is allowed to transfer information in a controlled manner from one security level to a lower level. Thus the trusted process may violate the *-property. Because of this capability, the trusted process would be subjected to close scrutiny in a message system being certified for multilevel secure operation.
IV. MILITARY MESSAGE EXPERIMENT [5] -[22]
The MME was a joint effort by the Navy, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), and CINCPAC to demonstrate and evaluate the utility of an interactive message handling system for operational military users. Begun formally in 1975, the MME led to the design and implementation of SIGMA. The MME test community used SIGMA operationally for over a year. During the MME, information regarding the military utility of automated message systems, such as SIGMA, was collected from several sources-computer-generated statistics, questionnaires, interviews, observations of users, and controlled exercises. Below, we summarize our major conclusions from the experiment.
An automated message system can be highly useful in a military environment, especially during a crisis, 1) by reducing message distribution times, 2) by providing more accurate distribution and retrieval, and 3) by providing word-processing capabilities for generating messages and other documents 0 The only significant difference between message system requirements for normal operations and those for crisis operaations is in performance: the system must handle a higher volume of traffic during a crisis.
0 An automated message system must provide services to everyone involved with message handling. Since each user may not have a terminal, the system must have well thought-out procedures for including these individuals in procedures that have been automated (e.g., distribution) [22] .
0 For certain message handling tasks, some users prefer manual to automated procedures. For example, in the MME, many users preferred paper copies for reviewing messages and manual coordination.
0 An automated message system must be an integral part of the user's information handling system. Users who draft messages need to refer to many documents, including other messages, reports, and letters. Many of these may be stored on other automated systems, such as word processors and command and control systems. Future message systems must allow a user to integrate information from other systems into his messages. Conversely, a user must be able to transfer information from his message system to other automated systems.
0 While difficult, it is not impossible to design a message system user interface that both provides required user capabilities and can be certified for multilevel secure operation 0 A user-oriented message system (e.g., SIGMA) and the telecommunications center message system with which it is associated (e.g., LDMX) must be integrated. Otherwise, some functions, such as message storage and, error checking, are duplicated and serious incompatibilities arise [22] . 0 An automated military message system can vary along many different dimensions. These dimensions, which include data objects and functions, the user interface, security and privacy constraints, performance requirements, and physical hardware, often interact in complex ways. A change in one dimension may have a detrimental effect on one or more other dimensions. For example, the addition of a new function can degrade the user interface, cause a deterioration in performance, or be prohibited because it violates the system's security constraints.
[221.
~ P O I .
V. FAMILY METHODOLOGY
The Problem
Since the early 1970's, Congress has repeatedly criticized the way in which message systems are developed and operated within the DoD. Congressional investigations have concluded that there has been too little standardization and too much duplicat[o$.
[ 1 ] - [4] . Although performing highly similar functions, most military message systems have been developed independently; until very recently, the DoD has exercised little central control. To correct the problem, Congress has directed the DoD to plan the common development of message systems, using common software and hardware to the extent feasible. A centralized approach to the development and operation of military message systems is expected to reduce costs in a number of areas, such as system development, system maintenance, user training, and the production of documentation.
Review of the requirements of future military message systems suggests that one system will not suffice for all environments. Several similar systems sharing certain functional capabilities and security requirements will be needed. Because they will operate in different environments, these systems will have important differences, e.g., in the special functions that they perform, in message input and output formats, in the systems to which they interface, in the number and types of users, in the volumes of messages that they handle, and in the hardware on which they are implemented.
The problem is to take advantage of the shared features without overly constraining the individual variations that make each system suitable for its particular environment. A message system for intelligence analysts, for example, shares certain features with a message system for command centers, but it may be unreasonable to insist that intelligence analysts and command center personnel use exactly the same system.
Alternative Approaches
With the more traditional approach, the first system in a series of similar systems is built to meet a specific set of requirements. Subsequent systems are produced by changing the code of the first system to satisfy new requirements. Since the structure of the first system may be heavily influenced by its specific requirements, later systems often suffer performance problems. Features that are not needed in the later systems are often retained because they are so tightly coupled to other features that they cannot be removed without costly reprogramming. Adding new features frequently requires awkward alterations to the basic structure of the program. This degrades the conceptual integrity of the program, making it difficult to understand and maintain.
With a modern approach, the family methodology [48] , [49] , designers consider the entire family before building a single member. A major task is to formulate a modular structure suitable for all family members. The different features of family members are assigned to separate modules, so that producing a different family member can be done by replacing modules, not by changing the overall program structure. For example, a family member with a different user command language can be generated by replacing the user command language module.
A major goal of this second approach is to anticipate changes and variations among family members during the design phase. The design is formulated to satisfy several sets of requirements rather than a single one. As a result, ways to tailor the design to a specific environment are an integral part of the design. In many cases, it is only important to know the general nature of changes, rather than exact changes. The design is not tied to precise sets of requirements. As a result, there is considerable flexibility with respect to changes that can be introduced at some future date.
In brief, the family methodology consists of the following two steps.
Step I-Identify the Shared Features o f Family Members:
AU family members share a set of common features. An example of a feature common to all message systems is the capability of users to display a received message. Since some members perform special functions, it may be convenient to identify a larger set of features than the set common to all members. For example, some message systems but not all may support user-created templates (see Section 111). The set of shared features may thus be larger than the set of features associated with any single member. The features of each member can then be described as a subset of the larger set, where the latter may be thought of as a shopping list from which each member chooses only those features that it requires. Thus, if a member does not need a particular feature of the larger set, the design approach allows the feature to be omitted from that member's implementation.
Step 2-Identify and Encapsulate the Differences Among Family Members: A software structure suitable for all family members is formulated; in that structure, the software is partitioned into modules that encapsulate the various distinguishing characteristics. These are information-hiding modules [50] . The differences among family members are reflected in different implementations of the individual modules. This allows a version to be tailored to a particular environment by replacing modules.
A problem is how to change one module without affecting other modules. The solution proposed by this methodology is to design an abstract interface [51] to each module. The design of the abstract interface is based on the shared features identified in Step 1. When a particular feature changes, only the module implementation changes; the abstract interface remains the same. Since communications between the changed module and other modules is through the abstract interface, each module is insulated from modifications to other modules.
Application of the Family Methodology to Military Message Systems
At the Naval Research Laboratory, this approach was applied to the design of military message systems.
Step I: We first needed a.model for each family member, so that for each model component we could determine whether it should be shared or whether it should vary among family members. In our model, each member is represented as a series of nested machines. The innermost machine is the physical hardware .with instructions that operate on a small collection of data types (e.g., registers and memory units). These hardware instructions and data types can be extended via software to support an abstract machine with its own data types and operations. This abstract machine can in turn be used to construct a second abstract machine with its own data types and operations. Fig. 1 illustrates a military message system model that consists of four layered machines: the physical hardware, operating system, message core, and user commander language.
The message core machine contains data types, such as messages, message-files, and message-file-directories, and data type operations, such as CREATE MSG, DESTROY MSG, SETFIELD MSG, and GETFIELD MSG. To the extent feasible, all message core data types are specified independently of one another: an operation on an object of a given data type affects only that object. The message core includes data types and operations required by every family member, e.g., messages and operations to display messages. In addition, it contains data types and operations required by some but not all family members, e.g., templates and operators to create, edit, and destroy templates.
The data types and operations of the user command language machine are the objects and commands available to the user of a particular system. Each operation of the user command language machine is usually more powerful than a message core operation, since the former may affect objects of many different data types. For example, the SIGMA user command, "CREATE FILE IRAN SECRET," both creates a new message-file (at the SECRET level) and adds an entry to a message-file-directory.
We determined that the hardware varies too much among current message systems for us to use the same physical machine for each member. A similar conclusion was reached with respect to the operating system: not all members are likely to be constructed with the same operating system, because operating systems are usually available on only a small number of machines. Finally, the user command language can be expected to differ among military message systems, because preferences, habits, and procedures vary among organizations.
We discovered that the significant shared feature of military message systems are functional capabilities (see Section 11). The message core captures these functional capabilities and is therefore shared by each member of the family. The message core for the family is a superset of all the data types and operations required by any family member. Given a family that includes the NMIC-SS, HERMES, and SIGMA as members, the total collection of message core data types could be divided into three subsets that support, respectively, the functional capabilities of the NMIC-SS, of HERMES, and of SIGMA. Be-cause these systems share many functional capabilities, the subsets would overlap. In each case, only that subset of the message core necessitated by the requirements of the particular family member would be present in the implementation.
Step 2: Except for the message core, the machines in Fig. 1 characterize ways in which family members may differ. The specific features of the physical hardware, operating system, and user command language of a particular family member can be hidden in software modules.
A wide range of user command languages can be implemented with the data types and operations of the messageA, core. Each user command language statement may be translated into some sequence of message core operations. For example, the SIGMA command, "CREATE FILE IRAN SECRET," can be converted to the sequence of message core operations: CREATE MSGFILE(IRAN, SECRET): ADDMSGFILE MFDIRECTORY (mfdid, IRAN, SECRET) .
Moreover, the message core is designed so that it can be implemented with any one of a large class of operating systems or even directly on the hardware. Each message core operation can be translated into a sequence of operating system calls or machine instructions, with a different program (implementation) associated with each different operating system or each different physical machine.
The modules that hide the specific features of each family member's user command language and of its operating system (or physical hardware) communicate via the message core. Thus the message core is an abstract interface between the user command language machine and the operating system/physical hardware machines. It insulates the user command language from differences in the operating system and physical hardware. Similarly, it insulates the operating system and physical hardware from differences in the user command language.
VI. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND RESEARCH ISSUES
Below we identify a number of trends and associated research issues in the design and development of future military message systems. 0 The handling of formal military messages will continue to be a combination of manual procedures and automation.
In future years, the amount of manual message processing in the DoD will decline. However, because some message processing tasks cannot be automated easily and because of organizational preferences, manual procedures will not be eliminated.
0 The current decline in hardware costs will cause large centralized message processors to be abandoned in favor of a number of smaller computers. In some cases, each user's terminal may be powerful enough to act as his own dedicated message processor. Small message processors will be connected together via local networks. Areas for future research include the design of more distributed message processors and the development of protocols and addressing schemes for the transmission of messages between networks.
While most current message systems handle only text messages, future systems must support new types of messages, such as facsimile, voice, and graphics. Human factors issues, terminal design, and protocols for supporting these new messages need to be explored.
Although there are numerous examples in which privacy controls would be useful, a comprehensive design of privacy controls for military message systems does not exist; such a design must be formulated and tested. While it may be possible in future years to construct message systems that can be certified for multilevel security, it is not yet &monstrated that a message system built with a general-purptxe security kernel will support the functional capabilities and performance required in many military message systems. To meet these requirements, it may be necessary to develop a special kernel, tailored to the message system application.
0 In many cases, current algorithms for automated distribution do not properly identify the recipient of a formal message. Additionally, the current practice of processing highprecedence messages first does not work well during a crisis, since the message system may become overloaded with highprgcedence messages. Algorithms to distribute messages more accurately and to determine the relative importance of messages within a precedence level are needed.
Message processing systems constitute only one of several different computer systems used by military 'personnel. Because each computer system is associated with a different terminal, a user who works with several systems is forced to operate with several terminals rather than a single one. Given the severe space constraints of some military environments and the desire to. enhance user effectiveness, a standard terminal that operates with all or most major computer systems used by military personnel requires development.
